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Abstract
Implementations of quantum key distribution as available nowadays
suffer from inefficiencies due to post processing of the raw key that severely
cuts down the final secure key rate. We present a simple model for the
error scattering across the raw key and derive ”closed form” expressions
for the probability of a parity check failure, or experiencing more than
some fixed number of errors. Our results can serve for improvement for
key establishment, as information reconciliation via interactive error cor-
rection and privacy amplification rests on mostly unproven assumptions.
We support those hypotheses on statistical grounds.
1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution is an emerging technology that promises information-
theoretic security, without computational infeasibility assumptions. Taking the
classical BB84 protocol as an example, this one comprises the following steps:
1. Alice sends randomly polarized photons to Bob
2. Bob measures in a random polarization basis
3. Bob keeps track of successful measurements
4. Bob tells Alice the polarizer settings he used
5. Alice tells Bob which settings have been correct
6. Both discard all incorrect measurements
7. Both map measurement results to a bitstring
8. Both perform error correction
9. Both perform privacy amplification
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In a nutshell, the idea is to exploit photons as carriers of information due
to their incapability of being copied. This renowned result is known as the
no-cloning theorem [17]. Hence, any unauthorized access to the information en-
coded in the photons will result in an unnaturally high error rate, thus revealing
the eavesdropping attempt eventually. The original protocol is found in [1]. A
rigorous proof of security is provided in [11], for instance.
We are particularly interested in step 8 of the BB84 protocol, in which Alice
and Bob locate and repair errors in their bit-strings. The process is known as
reconciliation, and involves Alice and Bob publicly exchanging parity bits in
order to correct errors and distill identical keys. With each published parity
bit, a piece of information leaks out and becomes visible to the adversary, which
is the reason why reconciliation is followed by privacy amplification. Basically,
this is the application of a strongly universal hash function on the output, in
order to create dependencies of the final bits on the bits that the adversary
did not get any information about, thus sufficiently decreasing the adversary’s
information. We shall not go into details about the privacy amplification, and
refer the reader to the literature on universal hashing [13, 14, 4] as well as
theoretical results about privacy amplification [8, 9], and references therein for
further information.
2 Interactive Error Correction
Let us pay closer attention to the error correction mechanism which has been
proposed along with the experimental implementation of BB84 [2]. Errors in
physical transmission media often exhibit burst structures, that is, a sequence of
consecutive errors is more likely to occur than sparse scattering. Consequently,
a popular trick is to permute the bits in the string prior to the error correction
in order to chop down long bursts into small pieces. Ideally, this leaves an
almost uniform pattern of erroneous bits in the result. This is the first step in
a protocol which has become known under the name Cascade.
After having agreed on a publicly known permutation of bits, Alice and Bob
take their shuffled strings and partition them into blocks of constant size k,
such that a single block is believed to contain no more than one error with high
probability. The protocol was first introduced in [2].
The problem of how errors are scattered across the raw key has been tackled
on statistical grounds in [5]. The authors of this work assume a binomial dis-
tribution of errors within the blocks, which is later approximated by a Poisson-
distribution.
We shall take a different route here, considering the process that induces
the errors to be Poissonian, as well as adapting the initial block-size using a
decision-theoretic approach. The authors of [5] do not provide a direct clue on
how to choose an optimal block-size for partitioning. This is the gap we intend
to close now. Before getting into details about how to cleverly choose the block-
sizes, let us outline the remaining steps in the error correction process. This
will highlight the room for improvement that an intelligent partitioning strategy
2
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can exploit.
Having split the string into blocks of equal size k, Alice and Bob publicly
compare parity bits of each block. Obviously, one error will change the parity,
and in general any odd number of errors will be discovered by observing dis-
agreeing parities. However, two or any larger even number of errors will remain
undetected with this method, which is why further stages of the process are
to follow, once the initial correction has been completed. For the correction of
errors, take an example-block with one indicated error, a block where a par-
ity mismatch was observed during the public comparison. Then this block is
searched for the error using a standard bisective search, which discloses a further
lot of log(k) parities of sub-blocks. The process is depicted in Figure 1 on page
3. To spot and remove remaining errors in the string, such as present in blocks
with an even number of errors in them, Alice and Bob repeat the shuffling and
partitioning steps, several times with increasing block-sizes.
Example: The inherent problem with parity checking, which motivates the
need for the repeated shuffling and creation of larger blocks, can be illustrated as
follows: assume that Alice and Bob share the following bit-strings, with errors
in Bob’s string being underlined,
Alice: 0011010100101101110101010011010 . . .
Bob: 0011011100101101000101111011000 . . .
Partitioning into blocks of equal size and comparing parities of blocks will let
some errors go undisclosed (parity bits are shown in the two middle rows; agree-
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ing parities hiding existing errors are underlined):
Alice: 00110︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
| 10100︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
| 10110︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
| 11101︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
| 01010︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
| 01101︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
|0 . . .
Bob:
0︷ ︸︸ ︷
00110 |
1︷ ︸︸ ︷
11100 |
1︷ ︸︸ ︷
10110 |
0︷ ︸︸ ︷
10001 |
0︷ ︸︸ ︷
01111 |
1︷ ︸︸ ︷
01100 |1 . . .
Sparing the shuffling of bits will save some errors from discovery, since two
blocks (in this example, the 4th and 5th) with even number of errors can form
a larger block with an even number of errors again. Therefore, permuting the
bits is inevitable to avoid such an undesirable coincidence.
Since the error correction up to now may be ineffective, as still having missed
some errors, Alice and Bob continue by comparing parities of random subsets of
bits they publicly agree on. Upon parity mismatch, a bisective search similarly
as above is performed to find and erase the error. In order to avoid information
leaking to the adversary, the last bit from each random subset is deleted. This
deletion is also done after comparing parities of blocks in the previous steps, for
the same reason.
The point at which almost all errors have been removed is detected by count-
ing the number of successful comparisons after having discovered the last error.
After a sufficient number of successful trials (20 is the number proposed in
[2]), the strings are accepted as identical, regarding the probability of errors
remaining undetected as negligible.
The protocol Cascade is based on this procedure and has been introduced
in a later paper [3], which presented improvements to the original reconciliation
protocol sketched above. Among the changes is the removal of the bit-deletion
step for the sake of detecting more errors faster, so the task of information
leakage reduction is shifted to the privacy amplification stage. The naming
stems from the strategy of increasing sizes of blocks in the first stages of the
protocol. Although a theoretical analysis of the protocol is provided, the authors
of [3], as well as those of [2] abstain from an analytical treatment of block-size
choices. Nevertheless, they give a simple heuristic based on estimating the error
frequency by direct comparison of a random sample of bits is provided in [2].
These bits have to be sacrificed for the sake of privacy too, if that approach is
adopted. To summarize, the error correction protocol in charge of current QKD
implementations relies on
Assumption 1 A block-size exists, such that by partitioning the raw key into
blocks of that given size, each block contains at most one error.
It is this assumption that we seek to support by our upcoming theoretical
considerations.
3 An error scattering model
We choose the Poisson process as the natural model for errors that occur within
a sequence of bits that can be arbitrarily long.
4
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Figure 2: Example error intensity parameter process
Definition 2 (Poisson process [10]) A Poisson process is a family of dis-
crete counting measures {N(t) : t ≥ 0}, which satisfy the following conditions:
1. N(0) = 0 (no events yet at the beginning).
2. The process has independent increments.
3. The number of events in any interval of length ∆t is Poisson distributed
with mean λ∆t. That is, for all t,∆t ≥ 0,
Pr {N(t+∆t)−N(t) = n} =
(λ ·∆t)n
n!
e−λ·∆t, n = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
In other words, the expected number of events linearly increases with the
length of the block.
Our Poisson process model N(t) will count the total number of errors in the
bit string at time t. Since our blocks should be chosen such that the expected
additional number of errors after taking a time-step ∆t is only 1. The intensity
parameter λ determines the frequency of events, i.e. errors in our case.
Assume that this intensity-parameter remains constant over a unit of time,
and denote it by Λ ∈ [0,∞). Figure 2 on page 5 shows an example with finite
time horizon T , and gamma-distributed error-rate (with parameters a = 10 and
b = 2 for the gamma-distribution), remaining constant over short periods of
time.
The probability of exactly k errors within a time unit is found from the law
of total probability: let X be the number of errors per time-unit, then
Pr {X = k} =
∫
∞
0
Pr {X = k|λ = x}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Poisson distributed
with parameter λ
Pr {λ = x}︸ ︷︷ ︸
intensity
parameter
dx. (1)
For the intensity-parameter, we assume a gamma-distribution. This choice is
intuitively reasonable, as this class is flexible and supported on the nonnegative
real line. Plugging into (1) the density of the Gamma-distribution given by
f(λ|a, b) =
{
ba
Γ(a)λ
a−1e−bλ, λ ≥ 0
0, λ < 0,
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and the density of the Poisson-distribution, which is
f(k|λ) =
λk
k!
e−λ,
we find
Pr {X = k} =
ba
k! Γ(a)
∫
∞
0
xk+a−1e−x(b+1)dx
=
baΓ(k + a)
k! (b+ 1)k+aΓ(a)
, (2)
where Γ denotes Euler’s Gamma-function. Figure 3 on page 6 shows an example
of this density with (arbitrarily chosen) parameters a = 10 and b = 2.
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This discrete probability density has a closed form expression for its first
moment. The expected number of errors per time unit for this model is
EX =
∞∑
k=0
k · Pr {k errors per time unit} =
a
b
. (3)
So far, we are almost done, because Assumption 1 stated in the previous
section can now easily be fulfilled: simply choose the block size inverse to the
expected number of errors, which will eventually leave a single error per block.
This can theoretically be justified by considering the following result, related
to Poisson processes in general: as we explicitly know the expected number of
errors within time-span ∆t, which is a
b
· (∆t). Assuming that the bits come in
at frequency f , then if n denotes the number of arriving bits within ∆t, we have
f · ∆t = n and the block-size in terms of bits is the solution of the equation
a
b
· n
f
= 1, i.e.
initial block-size n ≈
f
a/b
,
which is the block-size (in bits) that the Poisson process gives us. Observe that
we have a constant block-size again. The only difference to the original Cascade
6
variant is that it originates from a probabilistic model, rather than from pure
intuition.
All calculations above were done with the Maple software [6]. The density
of X can be derived by appropriately substituting terms under the integral to
obtain the same form as for a Gamma-distribution (with different parameters,
though). Then the normalizing constant takes the same form as for the gamma-
density, giving the result.
Using the density (2), we can give a formula for the probability of seeing
more than m errors during a time unit as
Pr {X > m} =
ba(a)m+1
(m+ 1)! (b+ 1)a+m+1
· 2F1
(
1,m+ a+ 1
m+ 2
1
b+1
)
, (4)
where a, b > 0 describe the Gamma-distribution of the intensity-parameter, 2F1
is the hypergeometric function (see Equation (9)), and (a)m is the Pochhammer
symbol (see Equation (10)).
Since error correction in the way used with quantum key distribution relies
on public parity comparisons, the event of missing an error is equal to the event
of having an even number of errors. The probability that the parity check can
indicate an error, is calculated as follows (the derivation is shown in Section 4):
Pr {odd number of errors} = podd =
1
2
[
1−
(
b
b+ 1
)a]
. (5)
For a finite string of length 2m+ 1, this probability is
p = podd − C(a, b,m) · 3F2
(
1,m+ 2 + a2 ,m+
3
2 +
a
2
m+ 2,m+ 52
1
(b+1)2
)
, (6)
where
C(a, b,m) =
baΓ(2m+ 3 + a)
Γ(a)(2m+ 3)! (b+ 1)2m+3+a
.
The previous results are an appealing tool for a proper choice of the param-
eters if an error-correcting code shall be used with the scheme. Employing clas-
sical error correction mechanisms may not work well, since our wish is to detect
eavesdropping via a raised error rate. Therefore, we cannot adopt any assump-
tion on how many errors will occur at maximum, and classical error-correcting
codes can no longer be used for that matter. However, if the probability of see-
ing more than m errors can be bounded, then such codes could become indeed
applicable. We shall not go into further details about this here.
4 Proofs
This section is dedicated to proving equations (3), (4), (5) and (6).
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For the probability distribution function let us first substitute c := b+1 into
(2), and set
F (m) = Pr {X ≤ m} =
m∑
k=0
Pr {X = k} =
m∑
k=0
baΓ(k + a)
k! (b+ 1)k+aΓ(a)
=
ba
(b + 1)aΓ(a)
m∑
k=0
Γ(k + a)
k! (b+ 1)k
∝
m∑
k=0
Γ(k + a)
k! ck
. (7)
Using the Maple software [6], we obtain for the finite sum (7),
(8)
G(m) =
m∑
k=0
Γ(k + a)
k! ck
=
Γ(a)(
c−1
c
)a − Γ(m+ 1 + a) · 2F1
(
1,m+ a+ 1
m+ 2
1
c
)
(m+ 1)! cm+1
,
where
pFq
(
a1, . . . , ap
b1, . . . , bq
x
)
:=
∞∑
k=0
(a1)k(a2)k · · · (ap)k
(b1)k(b2)k · · · (bq)k
xk
k!
(9)
is the generalized hypergeometric function, and
(x)n :=
Γ(x+ n)
Γ(x)
= x(x + 1)(x+ 2) · · · (x+ n− 1) (10)
is the Pochhammer symbol. Useful special cases are (1)k = k!, as well as
(2)k = (k + 1)!.
It is important to notice that the parameters of the Gamma density used
for deriving the density (2) satisfy a, b > 0, in which case 0 ≤ 1
c
= 1
b+1 < 1,
and the hypergeometric series in (8) converges absolutely for this argument, by
D’Lambert’s quotient criterion (see [12]). This is crucial for the permission to
rearrange the infinite sums in later stages of the upcoming derivation.
We verify expression (8) by induction. For m = 0, the hypergeometric
function evaluates to (using (9))
a
[
2F1
(
1, 1 + a
2
1
c
)]
= a
∞∑
k=0
(1)k(1 + a)k
(2)k
1
k! ck
=
∞∑
k=0
(a)k+1
(k + 1)!
1
ck
= c
∞∑
k=1
(a)k
k!
1
ck
.
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The last series can be written in the form
∞∑
k=1
(a)k
k!
αk
1
ck
= −1 +
∞∑
k=0
(a)k
k!
αk
1
ck
(11)
with coefficients αk = 1 for all k. This permits the application of an identity
due to Euler (cf. [7, 16, 15]),
∞∑
k=0
(a)k
k!
αkz
k = (1− z)−a
∞∑
k=0
(a)k
k!
∆kα0
(
z
1− z
)k
, (12)
with the forward difference ∆nα0 defined as
∆nα0 =
n∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
n
i
)
αn−i. (13)
Expression (13) can be evaluated directly using the Binomial formula:
∆na0 =
n∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
n
i
)
1n−i =
{
(−1 + 1)n = 0, for n > 0
(−1)0
(
0
0
)
10 = 1, for n = 0.
Hence, expression (11), by setting z := 1
c
and thanks to the identity (12) be-
comes (cf. also [12, pg. 46])
∞∑
k=1
(a)k
k!
1
ck
=
(
1−
1
c
)
−a
− 1,
and furthermore
a
[
2F1
(
1, 1 + a
2
1
c
)]
= c
((
1−
1
c
)
−a
− 1
)
. (14)
To accomplish the induction start atm = 0, we need to verify that (cf. Equation
(8))
Γ(a)
?
=
Γ(a)(
c−1
c
)a − 2F1
(
1, a+ 1
2
1
c
)
Γ(1 + a)
c
. (15)
The identity Γ(1 + a) = aΓ(a), in connection with Equation (14) then gives
Γ(a)(
c−1
c
)a − Γ(a)c
((
1− 1
c
)
−a
− 1
)
c
= Γ(a),
and claim (15) is proved.
Now, assume the formula to be valid up to m − 1. To accomplish the in-
duction step, let us look at the difference G(m+ 1)−G(m) (cf. Equation (8)),
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which we need to prove equal to the (m + 1)-th term in the series (7). The
difference between the m-th term and the (m+ 1)-th term of G(m+ 1) is
Γ(m+ 1 + a) · 2F1
(
1,m+ 1 + a
m+ 2
1
c
)
(m+ 1)! cm+1
−
Γ(m+ 2 + a) · 2F1
(
1,m+ 2 + a
m+ 3
1
c
)
(m+ 2)! cm+2
Using the common denominator (m+2)! cm+2 and the relation Γ(x+1) = xΓ(x)
to get Γ(m+ 2 + a) = (m+ 1 + a)Γ(m+ 1 + a), we can substitute
A := 2F1
(
1,m+ 2 + a
m+ 3
1
c
)
, B := 2F1
(
1,m+ 1 + a
m+ 2
1
c
)
into the last expression, to obtain the following equality, which is to be verified
c(m+ 2)Γ(m+ 1+ a)B − (m+ 1 + a)Γ(m+ 1 + a)A
(m+ 2)! cm+2
?
=
Γ(m+ a+ 1)
(m+ 1)! cm+1
,
where the right hand side is the (m + 1)-th term in the sum (7). The second
equality follows from Γ(m) = (m− 1)!, as m is an integer. Canceling the terms
Γ(m+ 1 + a), (m+ 1)! and cm+1 on both sides leaves us with
c(m+ 2)B − (m+ 1 + a)A
(m+ 2)c
?
= 1.
Dividing the nominator and denominator on the left hand side by c(m+ 2), we
need to verify if
B −
m+ 1 + a
(m+ 2)c
A
?
= 1. (16)
Consider only the right term in the difference, and substitute the expression for
A. Then we find
m+ 1 + a
(m+ 2)c
∞∑
k=0
(1)k(m+ 2 + a)k
(m+ 3)k
1
k! ck
=
∞∑
k=0
(m+ 1 + a)k+1
(m+ 2)k+1
1
ck+1
=
∞∑
k=1
(m+ 1 + a)k
(m+ 2)k
1
ck
(17)
by definition of the Pochhammer symbol (10). For the other term in (16), we
find by definition of the hypergeometric function (9),
B =
∞∑
k=0
(1)k(m+ 1 + a)k
(m+ 2)k
1
k! ck
=
∞∑
k=0
(m+ 1 + a)k
(m+ 2)k
1
ck
(18)
Subtracting expression (17) from expression (18) leaves only the 0-th term in
the sum, which is equal to 1, and (16) is proved.
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The distribution function in its complete form is finally obtained by substi-
tuting c = b + 1, and plugging (8) into (7), giving
F (m) = Pr {X ≤ m}
=
ba
(b+ 1)aΓ(a)

 Γ(a)( b
b+1
)a − Γ(m+ 1 + a) · 2F1
(
1,m+ a+ 1
m+ 2
1
b+1
)
(m+ 1)! (b+ 1)m+1


= 1−
ba
(b+ 1)aΓ(a)
Γ(m+ 1 + a) · 2F1
(
1,m+ a+ 1
m+ 2
1
b+1
)
(m+ 1)! (b+ 1)m+1
= 1−
ba(a)m+1
(m+ 1)! (b + 1)a+m+1
2F1
(
1,m+ a+ 1
m+ 2
1
b+1
)
.
Expected Number of Errors
Since our model assumes Poissonian error scattering with a gamma-distributed
intensity-parameter, recall that if the random variable X is Poissonian with
parameter λ, then EX = λ. But λ is gamma-distributed with parameters
a, b > 0, so the average number of errors per time unit will come to the average
error rate, which in turn is the first moment of the Gamma-distribution, and
hence found as
EX =
a
b
.
Alternatively, one can verify the above relation by carrying out similar calcu-
lations as for obtaining the distributions function. The only additional task is
then a limit process, which can be tackled in a very similar way as shown below.
Parity Check Failure
We wish to prove that the probability for an odd number of errors is given by
(5), and that for a given string that is 2m+1 bit long, the probability of having
an odd number of errors is (6).
We prove (5) by first proving (6) by induction, and then letting m approach
infinity. Using (7), the probability of an odd number of errors in a string of
length 2m+ 1 is proportional to
m∑
k =0
Γ(2k + 1 + a)
(2k + 1)! c2k+1
=
Γ(a+ 1)
((
1 + 1
c
)a
−
(
1− 1
c
)a)
2a
(
1 + 1
c
)a (
1− 1
c
)a
−
Γ(2m+ 3 + a) · 3F2
(
1,m+ 2 + a2 ,m+
3
2 +
a
2
m+ 2,m+ 52
1
c2
)
(2m+ 3)! c2m+3
,
(19)
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where the equality can be obtained using the Maple software package. We
verify this equality by induction. Equations (5) and (6) are obtained by sub-
stituting c = b + 1, multiplying with b
a
(b+1)aΓ(a) , taking the limit m → ∞ and
re-arranging terms.
Induction start: Substitute m = 0 into the last expression, then the problem
is to verify whether
Γ(a+ 1)
((
1 + 1
c
)a
−
(
1− 1
c
)a)
2a
(
1 + 1
c
)a (
1− 1
c
)a
−
Γ(a+ 3) · 2F1
(
1, 2 + a2 ,
3
2 +
a
2
2, 52
1
c2
)
6c3
?
=
Γ(a+ 1)
c
is true. By applying the identity Γ(a+3) = (a+1)(a+2)Γ(a+1) and multiplying
with c, we can cancel Γ(a+ 1) in each term to get
(20)
[
c
2
((
1 + 1
c
)a
−
(
1− 1
c
)a)
a
(
1 + 1
c
)a (
1− 1
c
)a − 1
]
−
(a+ 1)(a+ 2) · 2F1
(
1, 2 + a2 ,
3
2 +
a
2
2, 52
1
c2
)
6c2
?
= 0.
The hypergeometric function is by definition
2F1
(
1, 2 + a2 ,
3
2 +
a
2
2, 52
1
c2
)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1)k
(
2 + a2
)
k
(
3
2 +
a
2
)
k
(2)k
(
5
2
)
k
1
k! c2k
=
∞∑
k=0
(
2 + a2
)
k
(
3
2 +
a
2
)
k
(k + 1)!
(
5
2
)
k
1
c2k
. (21)
The Pochhammer symbol satisfies the following identities, which we can use to
simplify the terms in the series (cf. [15]):
(a)k
(
a+
1
2
)
k
=
1
4k
(2a)2k, (22)
(a+ 1)k =
a+ k
a
(a)k, (23)(
3
2
)
k
=
(2k + 1)!
k! 4k
. (24)
The term
(
5
2
)
k
=
(
3
2 + 1
)
k
can be evaluated using (23) and (24) to give(
5
2
)
k
=
3 + 2k
3
·
(2k + 1)!
k! 4k
. (25)
The nominator of the terms in the series (21) are found using (22) as(
3
2
+
a
2
)
k
(
2 +
a
2
)
k
=
1
4k
(
2
(
3
2
+
a
2
))
2k
=
1
4k
(a+ 3)2k. (26)
12
Substituting (25) and (26) into (21) gives
2F1
(
1, 2 + a2 ,
3
2 +
a
2
2, 52
1
c2
)
(a+ 1)(a+ 2)
= (a+ 1)(a+ 2)
∞∑
k=0
1
4k
(a+ 3)2k
(k + 1)! 2k+33
(2k+1)!
k!4k
1
c2k
= 3
∞∑
k=0
(a+ 1)2k+2
(k + 1)(2k + 3)(2k + 1)!
1
c2k
= 3c2
∞∑
k=1
(a+ 1)2k
k(2k + 1)(2k − 1)!
1
c2k
= 3c2
∞∑
k=1
2k(a+ 1)2k
k(2k + 1)!
1
c2k
= 6c2
∞∑
k=1
(a+ 1)2k
(2k + 1)!
1
c2k
,
so that
Γ(a+ 3)2F1
(
1, 2 + a2 ,
3
2 +
a
2
2, 52
1
c2
)
6c2
=
∞∑
k=1
(a+ 1)2k
(2k + 1)!
1
c2k
.
Substituting z := 1
c
in the last expression, as well as in the term in square
brackets in (20), our task is to verify whether
∞∑
k=1
(a+ 1)2k
(2k + 1)!
z2k
?
=
1
2az
[
1
(1− z)a
−
1
(1 + z)a
]
− 1
holds. This is achieved, by forming the Taylor-series expansion of the right hand
side around z = 0, turning out equal to the series on the left side.
Induction step: To accomplish the induction step, we compare the difference
between the results when substituting m+ 1 and m into (19), which should be
equal to the (m+ 1)-th term in the finite sum.
This difference comes to
Γ(2m+ 3 + a)
(2m+ 3)! c2m+3
?
=
Γ(2m+ 3 + a) · 3F2
(
1,m+ 2 + a2 ,m+
3
2 +
a
2
m+ 2,m+ 52
1
c2
)
(2m+ 3)! c2m+3
−
Γ(2m+ 5 + a) · 3F2
(
1,m+ 3 + a2 ,m+
5
2 +
a
2
m+ 3,m+ 72
1
c2
)
(2m+ 5)! c2m+5
.
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Using the identity Γ(2m+5+ a) = (2m+3+ a)(2m+4+ a)Γ(2m+ 3+ a),
and dividing by the right hand side leaves us with the claim
1
?
= 3F2
(
1,m+ 2 + a2 ,m+
3
2 +
a
2
m+ 2,m+ 52
1
c2
)
−
[
(2m+ 3 + a)(2m+ 4 + a)
(2m+ 4)(2m+ 5)c2
· 3F2
(
1,m+ 3 + a2 ,m+
5
2 +
a
2
m+ 3,m+ 72
1
c2
)]
.
Let us pay closer attention to the term in square brackets. By canceling 2 from
all four brackets in the fraction in front of the hypergeometric function, and
writing down the latter as a series, we obtain(
m+ 2 + a2
) (
m+ 32 +
a
2
)
(m+ 2)
(
m+ 52
)
c2
∞∑
k=0
(
m+ 3 + a2
)
k
(
m+ 52 +
a
2
)
k
(m+ 3)k
(
m+ 72
)
k
1
c2k
Using the identity a(a+ 1)n = (a)n+1, we can assemble the nominator and the
denominator into the sum’s terms to find(
m+ 2 + a2
) (
m+ 32 +
a
2
)
(m+ 2)
(
m+ 52
)
c2
∞∑
k=0
(
m+ 3 + a2
)
k
(
m+ 52 +
a
2
)
k
(m+ 3)k
(
m+ 72
)
k
1
c2k
=
∞∑
k=0
(
m+ 2 + a2
)
k+1
(
m+ 32 +
a
2
)
k+1
(m+ 2)k+1
(
m+ 52
)
k+1
1
c2(k+1)
=
∞∑
k=1
(
m+ 2 + a2
)
k
(
m+ 32 +
a
2
)
k
(m+ 2)k
(
m+ 52
)
k
1
c2k
= 3F2
(
1,m+ 2 + a2 ,m+
3
2 +
a
2
m+ 2,m+ 52
1
c2
)
− 1
and the claim is proved.
Limit for m→∞
Our final task is calculating
lim
m→∞
Γ(2m+ 3 + a)
(2m+ 3)! c2m+3
· 3F2
(
1,m+ 2 + a2 ,m+
3
2 +
a
2
m+ 2,m+ 52
1
c2
)
.
To get rid of the generalized hypergeometric function, let us upper-bound
the series by upper-bounding each term separately. We have
3F2
(
1,m+ 2 + a2 ,m+
3
2 +
a
2
m+ 2,m+ 52
1
c2
)
=
∞∑
k=0
(
m+ 2 + a2
)
k
(
m+ 32 +
a
2
)
k
(m+ 2)k
(
m+ 52
)
k
1
c2k
≤
∞∑
k=0
[(m+ 2 + a)k]
2
[(m+ 2)k]2
1
c2k
≤
[
∞∑
k=0
(m+ 2 + a)k
(m+ 2)k
1
ck
]2
,
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where we have used the inequality (x)k ≤ (y)k, for 0 ≤ x ≤ y. Because m is an
integer, we can write (2m + 3)!= Γ(2m + 4). By substituting z := 1
c
> 0 we
obtain
Γ(2m+ 3 + a)
(2m+ 3)!
· 3F2(. . .) ≤


∞∑
k=0
Γ(2m+ 3 + a)2
Γ(2m+ 4)2
(m+ 2 + a)k
(m+ 2)k︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:α(k)
zk


2
. (27)
Expanding the Pochhammer symbols on the right hand side in terms of the
gamma function, the coefficient α(k) of zk becomes
α(k) = Γ(2m+ 3 + a)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:[P (m)]2
1
Γ(2m+ 4)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:[Q(m)]2
Γ(m+ 3 + a+ k)
Γ(m+ 2 + k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:R(m)
Γ(m+ 2)
Γ(m+ 3 + a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:S(m)
Considering the terms P (m), Q(m), R(m), S(m) separately significantly simpli-
fies matters, when we apply D’Alambert’s quotient-criterion to investigate the
convergence of the series (27). The quotient of interest is∣∣∣∣αk+1zk+1αkzk
∣∣∣∣ = z P (m+ 1)2P (m)2 Q(m+ 1)
2
Q(m)2
R(m+ 1)
R(m)
S(m+ 1)
S(m)
,
where positive values are guaranteed since all involved quantities are positive.
Let us consider the four quotients individually:
i) P (m+ 1)/P (m): This is
P (m+ 1)
P (m)
=
Γ(2m+ 5 + a)
Γ(2m+ 3 + a)
= (2m+ 3 + a)(2m+ 4 + a), (28)
because Γ(2m+ 5+ a) = (2m+ 3+ a)(2m+ 4 + a)Γ(2m+ 3 + a).
ii) Q(m+ 1)/Q(m): Using the same reasoning as before, we get
Q(m+ 1)
Q(m)
=
Γ(2m+ 4)
Γ(2m+ 6)
=
1
(2m+ 4)(2m+ 5)
. (29)
Multiplying (28) with (29), we obtain a rational function with polynomials
of equal order and leading coefficient in the nominator and denominator.
It follows that
lim
m→∞
P (m+ 1)2
P (m)2
Q(m+ 1)2
Q(m)2
= 1
iii) S(m + 1)/S(m): Once more, exploiting the recurrence relation for the
Γ-function, Γ(m + 3) = Γ(m + 2)(m + 2) and Γ(m + 4 + a) = (m + 3 +
a)Γ(m+ 3 + a), we find
S(m+ 1)
S(m)
=
m+ 2
m+ 3 + a
→ 1, as m→∞.
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iv) R(m+ 1)/R(m): Analogously as for the quotient S(m+ 1)/S(m),
R(m+ 1)
R(m)
=
m+ 3 + a+ k
m+ 2 + k
= 1 +
1
m+ 2 + k
≤ 1 +
1
m+ 2
,
where the second inequality is valid since k ≥ 1.
Now, choose two constants ρ1, ρ2 > 1 such that zρ1ρ2 < 1, which is possible
since 0 < z < 1 is itself a constant (recall that z = 1
c
= 1
b+1 and b > 0).
Convergence of all quotients implies the existence of constants M1,M2 such
that [P (m + 1)Q(m + 1)]2/[P (m)Q(m)]2 ≤ ρ1 for m ≥ M1. Furthermore,
we have S(m + 1)/S(m) ≤ 1 for all m ≥ 0 (because a > 0), and finally,
R(m + 1)/R(m) ≤ ρ2 for every m ≥ M2. Setting q := zρ1ρ2 and choosing
M := max {M1,M2}, we find a uniform bound for (27) given by the geometric
series with quotient q < 1. Hence, the series (27) is ultimately bounded by a
constant L > 0 for every m > M . So
Γ(2m+ 3 + a)
(2m+ 3)!
· 3F2(. . .) ≤ L
2
for m > M , and furthermore,
0 ≤ lim
m→∞
Γ(2m+ 3 + a)
(2m+ 3)! c2m+3
3F2
(
1,m+ 2 + a2 ,m+
3
2 +
a
2
m+ 2,m+ 52
1
c2
)
≤ lim
m→∞
L2
c2m+3
= 0,
since c = b+ 1 > 1.
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